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Forecasting Mass Destruction, from Gulf to Gulf
by Sheila Carapico | published September 29, 2005
While internally displaced Americans were piled into an unequipped New Orleans sports
stadium, the question on everyone’s lips was: where were the Louisiana National Guard and
its high-water trucks when Hurricane Katrina struck? One answer, obviously, was that at
least a third of the Guard’s human and mechanical resources were deployed to Iraq. Antiwar protesters demonstrating in Washington on September 24, 2005 as a new storm
battered the Gulf coast turned the question into a new slogan: “Make Levees, Not War.”
Pundits and protesters shared a gloomy sense of connection between the seemingly
unrelated storylines of catastrophe along the Gulf of Mexico and the no less catastrophic US
military intervention in the Persian Gulf. Linked to the Iraq war by repugnant pictures and
abject forecasting malfunctions, and converging with the war’s impact on the American
pocketbook via soaring government expenses and gas prices, the weather-wrought calamity
simultaneously revealed and concealed US mishaps in the Middle East.

Cinema Verité
First, there was the sheer, horrifying spectacle of it. The scale and duration of destruction
and death and the feelings of vulnerability and sadness associated with the hurricane
recalled the attacks of September 11, 2001. But the video itself was more extensive and
less telegenic. Katrina unleashed a torrent of unsightly visual images Americans hardly ever
see on television, so many close-ups of the feeble and the dispossessed, the angry and the
unkempt, people who live in slums, trailers and nursing homes. The gritty cinema veritéon
the 24-hour news channels was vaguely evocative of the vile photos from inside Abu Ghraib
prison, in that case snapshots of a ghostly, humiliating reality captured on handheld phones
and delivered uncensored and disembedded from the dominant narrative. Now the normally
invisible American poor—so invisible that evacuation plans overlooked them—literally
stretched out their hands to the cameras.
On the scene days before the federal government’s relief convoys, camera crews offered
relief neither to their hapless subjects nor to the sickened audience. The running
commentary offered no soothing undertone of triumph over adversity, no climax wherein
heroes race to the rescue. Katrina was not the Asian tsunami of 2004, with selfcongratulatory coverage of care packages air-dropped efficiently and effectively by the US
Air Force to those left alive, but endless footage of those left to die. People who stuck it out
or swam their families to safety were presented not as plucky survivors but as pathetic
refugees or rowdy rabble. The New Orleans story conjured the discomfort of the Abu Ghraib
photos because the pictures themselves were ugly, raw and unedited, and because, unlike
on September 11 when New York firemen charged into the towering inferno, there were
really no good guys in sight, not even a poster child. Jean Baudrillard, the intellectual
inspiration for the films in The Matrix series, might call it “hyper-real.” What was captured
on camera failed to simulate the simulation.

Unpredictability
The New Orleans deluge washed up epistemological questions about how we know what we
know, what events or circumstances can be foreseen, and the differences among
possibilities, probabilities, predictions and scenarios. How did this happen after four years of
talking about “preparedness” for melodramatic emergencies centered on terrorist sabotage

of vital infrastructure? How could the vast new Department of Homeland Security have
failed to absorb the engineering reports, meteorological studies and flood simulations that
were both ample and amply available, and failed to make adequate preparations for a storm
predicted for days whose effects had been foretold for decades?
The dissonance between assurances of preparedness and the discombobulated response to
Katrina was deeply disconcerting to the US national psyche. Again government failed to
anticipate and respond to danger, whether from terrorists, rogue nations or the weather. AlQaeda was already on the radar screen of intelligence analysts and specialized academics in
2001, and evidence that the organization was actively planning a major attack on the
United States was arguably overlooked. But the stunning hijackings and crash landings of
September 11 had certainly not been mapped onto a trajectory with the accuracy found in
the Army Corps of Engineers’ projections of the impact of a Category 5 storm surge upon
the Crescent City’s soup bowl. In this sense, the collapse of the World Trade Center towers
was a complete surprise. Katrina felt “as big as 9/11” to many Americans, except that this
time the national protectors had no excuse for being caught off guard. The president’s selfexculpatory bleat notwithstanding, plenty of experts had “anticipated the breach of the
levees.”
It is bad enough that the nation’s soothsayers failed to foresee the two episodes of actual
mass death and destruction in US cities. Now juxtapose those blind spots with the Bush
administration’s pseudo-scientific evidence of illicit weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and
the fatal consequences thereof.
The story of the wild WMD chase went beyond faulty interpretation of aerial photography. It
involved the systematic discrediting of the professional arms inspectors who had halted the
Iraqi nuclear program and then spent a decade destroying what remained of Saddam
Hussein’s chemical arsenal and biological weapons research. It required the methodical
sidelining of dissenting expert opinion on the uses of aluminum tubes. Rather than
champion the findings of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
former Secretary of State Colin Powell showed the world satellite photos and diagrams as he
wove a phantasmagoric narrative about substances hypothetically manufactured in labmobiles or Saddam’s basement and then passed off to terrorists and smuggled into the US
in suitcases. It involved transforming the notion of “mass” from a quantitative measure of
scale to a quality that inheres in a substance even in miniscule amounts, as if a sarin gas
attack in Tokyo were the equivalent of an atomic bomb in Hiroshima. Along with the most
serious news outlets like the New York Times and the PBS NewsHour, a majority of
Congressional representatives took this narrative at face value, and a defeated, disarmed
and dilapidated dictatorship was magnified into a genuine threat to US national security.
The delusions of a handful of Iraqi exiles who expected to be showered with roses during
their triumphant homecoming atop US tanks were preferred over the sober assessments
from inside the Pentagon. The perpetually surprised Bush administration embodies
Americans’ missing danger monitor, but the failure was epistemic. There is now a great,
gaping credibility gap.

Mounting Costs
If these mismatches between “preparedness” and preparation have induced national
trauma, the anxiety is heightened by the double whammy of disaster-area reconstruction
costs and spiraling gas prices.

Just how will the United States pay for rebuilding along Gulf coast beaches and shoring up
the Persian Gulf beachhead simultaneously? With bills from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita still
being totted up, Bush has already quietly taken his top domestic priorities—making his tax
cuts permanent and privatizing Social Security—off the table. The 2001 and 2003 tax cuts
translated into $225 billion in lost revenue. According to a tally released on August 31 by
the Institute for Policy Studies, the Iraq war has cost US taxpayers $204.4 billion and
counting. That is well over $400 billion worth of red ink to drench the federal budget.
Reconstruction in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Texas could rival those expenditures.
And where, exactly, will those billions go? So far two Iraq war profiteers, the Halliburton
subsidiary Kellogg, Brown and Root and Bechtel, are among the 22 companies the Corps of
Engineers awarded no-bid "indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity” contracts to rebuild the
region devastated by Katrina. These contracts have drawn critical attention from the
Government Accountability Office and Congress because they are open-ended and
insufficiently specific about the work to be performed. (In Iraq, for instance, an indefinite
delivery-indefinite quality contract for “information technology” was used to hire the
Virginia-based company called CACI to supply interrogators for Abu Ghraib.) KBR, which
had to repay the government millions overcharged in Iraq, was allocated $16 million to
repair the New Orleans levees before Rita damaged them further.
Not only the national pocketbook, but also the household checkbook, will take a hit. The
twin typhoons’ damage to rigs, refineries and shipping in the Gulf of Mexico drove gasoline
and heating oil costs to new highs. This gives us good reason to reconsider the fuelprofligate policies of the past 15 years of economic growth in the United States. That growth
has been led by domestic consumption, especially mall-and-McMansion “development” in
exurbs accessible only by automobile and the related markets in housing-lending and gasguzzling vehicles. Ironically, today’s SUVs are the descendants of the high-end, heavy-duty,
off-road, four-wheel drive luxury jeeps, such as the Toyota Landcruiser and the Chevy
Suburban, that were developed in the 1970s, at the peak of the oil boom, for the Saudi
Arabian market. The suburban cowboys who are the Republican base will feel higher gas
prices more than cuts in either taxes or social services. Along with other middle Americans,
they may begin to wonder whether US Persian Gulf policy, which in the subliminal popular
imagination is connected to the American “way of life” via the gas pump, is working. In
short, the American way of life is getting a great deal more expensive as the costs of the
war mount and the $50 tank of gas threatens to become not only the norm, but a fond
memory. Evacuations in advance of Rita that wasted all the gasoline in Texas were but
another shocking symptom of hydrocarbon addiction.
Perhaps, along the lines of the New Deal or the Marshall Plan, massive government deficit
funding and tax incentives for shoreline, rural and urban redevelopment will lead to a new
era of prosperity in one of the poorest regions in North America. It is possible that the Ninth
Ward, totally swamped twice in one month, will rise again as McOrleans, with a reproduction
French Quarter mall surrounded by houses with porches like Sen. Trent Lott’s, and that the
Mississippi delta of the future will look more like South Florida, and that Houston will build
new roads to alleviate traffic jams in future evacuations. For that matter, Galveston could
imitate Dubai, crafting islands in the shape of world maps and palm trees in the Gulf. Or a
more environmentally sound coastal policy could be pursued. But none of this can be done
with Monopoly money; the government must tax more, borrow more or slash spending
drastically in other areas. Moreover, whether the policies of burning off fossil fuels with little
thought to conservation, ignoring global warming pessimists’ dire prophesies of low-land
inundation and waving off the Kyoto protocols are contributing to the frequency and

intensity of biblical floods or not, the era of “development” and “security” both pinned to the
premise of endless supplies of plentiful cheap petroleum is probably behind us.

Seeing the Unseen
Storm stories pushed Iraq news off US front pages even as the mayhem there took an even
more ominous turn, with record deaths a month before the yea-or-nay vote slated for
October 15 on the deeply flawed draft constitution. Homeland destruction became the proxy
for what Americans don’t see in Iraq coverage. Both stories lack a heartwarming
metanarrative. Abu Ghraib notwithstanding, heavy censorship has so far kept the public
from viewing much of the human and material wreckage wrought upon Iraq in the last two
and a half years. In ten days, there were more portraits of corpses in New Orleans,
abandoned in wheelchairs or floating in muck, than 30 months of Iraq war coverage has
yielded. Americans saw no pictures of the internally displaced of Falluja in November 2004,
nor of the people forcibly evacuated from Tall Afar during the week of the New Orleans
emergency. Many Americans readily buy the official myth that people in Iraq are better off
despite displacement and shaky access to electricity and running water, but when former
First Lady Barbara Bush tried that cynical line on Katrina evacuees in a Texas shelter, she
prompted sneers of derision.
The tide of US public opinion has turned: a majority of Americans now think homeland
security begins at home. The story about democratizing Iraq, including the current chapter
on constitutional-referendum-as-panacea, increasingly reads like a fairy tale.
Abroad, in the Arab and international media, the waters crested over the dam and have
sought a new level. US imperialism is projected via a reputation for omniscience and
omnipotence, intelligence and power of epic proportions, great wealth and ultimate
invincibility. The teleological conspiracy theories so rampant in the Arab world linking the
September 11 attacks to the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, fed by the
outright lies about WMDs—the US must have known, even planned, how things would turn
out—are built on this parable of indestructibility and foolproof information. Now it turns out
that it is not only Asian nations that lack early warning systems to sound the alarm before
disaster strikes; it is not only Asians who have to smell the stench of death in the streets for
weeks or have to beg for basic necessities. On al-Jazeera, the coverage has been respectful
and sympathetic, but not without a few tastes of irony, both whimsical and bitter. The panArab satellite channel reported Fidel Castro’s offer of a Cuban relief package as if it might be
accepted. It also broadcast pictures of uniformed and armed Americans bypassing corpses
that would be familiar to regular viewers of its photojournalism from Iraq. The bankruptcy
of US promises of “security” in both Gulfs lies devastatingly exposed.
The Bush administration chose this moment to send its new Undersecretary of State for
Public Diplomacy, the inveterate spinstress Karen Hughes, on a “listening tour” of Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As she deflected pointed questions with platitudes and promises,
her audiences responded with growing incredulity. The credibility gap is felt there, too.

